Little is known on how and whether central bank announcements aect consumers' beliefs about policy relevant economic gures. This paper focuses on consumers' perceptions and expectations of ination and interest rates and condence therein. Based on a sound identication (running surveys shortly before and after communication events), and relying on above 15 000 observations, spanning over 12 FOMC press conferences between December 2015 and June 2018, we document the impact of the central bank communication on ordinary people. While announcement events have little measurable direct eect on average beliefs, they make people more likely to receive news about the central bank's policy. In general, informed consumers tend to have lower perceptions and expectations, higher condence and, to an extent, better quality beliefs.
after the communication event, when the central bank credibly announces its monetary policy, people have to incorporate this news in their expectation model (this approach is adopted, for example, in Preston, 2010, 2012) . Prior to the announcement news coverage and expert opinions already equip consumers with easily interpretable and ready to use information. An announcement by the central bank thus potentially aects expectations of consumers in two ways: rst, by increasing the precision of the information about future developments, due to the actual information content of news, and, second, by increasing the probability of being exposed to news as the amount of news increases. Some consumers would have received expert reports before the announcement, and their beliefs may therefore be unaected by the press conference. Others would miss news both before and after the announcement, and also remain unaected. But there may be a cohort of consumers who did not receive any news before the announcement, yet higher news coverage after the announcement makes them informed. If it also aects their expectations, the average expectation in the sample may change. We study therefore both the overall eect, and the two channels -updating of beliefs, conditional on the information set, and changes in exposure to news. This paper is linked to several strands of research. In terms of how central bank communication aects non-expert beliefs, it relates to Haldane and McMahon (2018) , Coibion et al. (2018) and Coibion et al. (2019) . Haldane and McMahon (2018) survey MPhil students and the general public to investigate the impact of monetary policy communication on consumers' beliefs by focusing on the accessibility of the message conveyed. " Coibion et al. (2018) look at ination expectations of managers. In particular, managers, similar to consumers, expect higher ination than professional forecasters do. Additional information on monetary policy changes their rms' investment behavior. While this supports the relevance of the central bank communication, the eect is short lived, and the authors conclude that more aggressive and direct means of communication are needed. Coibion et al. (2019) conduct a randomized controlled trial of U.S. households and ana-" In their experiment, participants from general public and Oxford MPhil students outlined their expectations for CPI ination, unemployment and interest rates over the two year horizon. They were then given either the traditional summary of the decision of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee, or the simplied version of it, and subsequently, an opportunity to adjust their reported beliefs. lyze how dierent types of communication regarding monetary policy aect consumers' ination expectations. They show that providing households with simple statistics has a much larger eect on expectations than oering them the post-meeting statement or a news article.
With regard to consumers' expectations, our paper relates to research analyzing how their expectations and perceptions are formed and which factors drive them. Easaw et al. (2013) as well as Dräger and Lamla (2017) Finally, related to the literature on the role of mass media, our ndings conrm and emphasize the relevance of the media news channel of the transmission of policy announcements (Berger et al., 2011; Böhm et al., 2012; Reid et al., 2011) and characterize the mechanism of the impact of announcements on people's perceptions and expectations of interest rates and ination. Berger et al. (2011) see two primary functions for the media: (1) dissemination of the information about the central bank decisions, and (2) improving the understanding of those decisions by the public. They analyze the media coverage of the ECB announcements and nd, inter alia, that central bank communication intensies media coverage. Similarly, Binder (2017) shows that media coverage of the Fed and its Chair is elevated on the day of or following a press conference. Still, its impact on expectations and decisions of the public remains unknown; in particular, it needs to be shown that increased coverage (supply of news) leads to an increased exposure (absorption of news by consumers). # This is an aspect where we contribute to this strand of literature.
Our main irrelevance result, i.e. no impact of announcements on either beliefs or condence of consumers, indicates poor eciency of the existing policy communication regime, especially in stark contrast with how markets and professionals react to announcements.
The good news is that press-conferences indeed trigger better outreach: more consumers receive news about the Fed. Even though one could wish more people get the news, the burning question is whether information that people receive about the Fed helps guide their beliefs and decisions. So far our data reveals only a very limited impact, and this is where central banks should concentrate their eorts. So far we observe a signicant gap in beliefs and condence between informed and uninformed individuals. Thus the work should be directed not only at making more people informed, but also at making them understand the information they receive. All in one a big agenda to make policy news matter for little people.
Identication strategy, survey design and data
At the heart of the paper is a sound identication strategy which allows us to better isolate the eects of announcement events on consumer perceptions and expectations.
We conduct a survey of the U.S. public in rounds that are precisely timed around regular FOMC press conferences. The timeline of our data collection per announcement event is as follows: First wave invitations are sent out on Monday morning, 2 days ahead of the FOMC press-conference on a Wednesday, and the second wave invitations are sent out on Thursday. The speed with which responses are collected is vital for the identication. If responses in each wave are collected quickly, we end up with two non-overlapping crosssections of expectations and perceptions taken within a maximum of 5 days between each other, minimizing the impact of other possible macroeconomic factors. Conventional ways to target respondents (letters or telephone interviews) do not allow one to collect enough responses within this short event window, therefore we resort to an online survey platform, # That media aects nancial markets is widely accepted, e.g. see Hayo and Neuenkirch (2012) within 6 hours or less. Surveymonkey incentivizes respondents by oering an opportunity to win a sweepstakes prize, earn credits to redeem for rewards, or make a donation to a charity of respondents' choice upon completion of the survey. Pre-registered users (over 18 years old) are invited to participate in the survey. The panels are balanced according to census data of age and gender; according to the provider, "location tends to balance out naturally". While selection is intentionally random from a panel of millions of potential respondents, there is an additional guarantee that the repeated survey is not sent to the same people within any 100-day period.
The survey covers 15 questions. % The full questionnaire is in Appendix A. The core questions relate to perceptions and expectations of ination and interest rates. We adapt the style of the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers for questions on perceptions and expectations of ination and interest rates. For instance, the question on perceived ination is worded as "From your perspective, by how much did prices in general change during the past 12 months? Please use the drop-down menu below. For example, if you think prices on average have decreased by about 5%, choose "down by 5%"; if you think they have risen by 5%, choose "up by 5%"", and the question on interest rates is "What annual interest rate do you think an average US citizen would be charged, if they take a car loan of $ 10,000 this week? Please use the drop-down menu below." As central bank communication might aect not only the level of expectations but also the degree of perceived uncertainty (communication might reduce uncertainty with regard to ination or interest rates without changing their expected levels) we also ask how condent respondents are in their answer by using a 5-point scale. Such a condence question follows each of the four perception and expectation questions.
An important innovation is the inclusion of the exposure to news question "During the last week, have you heard any news about the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve $ Binder and Rodrigue (2018) compare an online survey-based information experiment to study consumers' formation of ination expectations with other non-web-based survey experiments and show that the web-based format yields reliable results. Other studies using data collected through Surveymonkey include, e.g., Solnick and Hemenway (2009) and Wiswall and Zafar (2015) . Alternative platforms (e.g. Qualtrics, as in Bursztyn et al. (2014) ) oer a similar service, yet with a dierent incentive scheme (participants are directly paid for responses). % Having the survey short keeps subjects motivated (Vinogradov and Shadrina, 2013 ) and helps achieve high completion rates.
(Fed)? What did you hear?" The answer options are formulated as "I have heard that the Fed would raise/keep at the current level/lower interest rates" in each pre-announcement wave, and as "I have heard that the Fed is raising/keeping at the current level/lowering interest rates" in each post-announcement wave. This wording is chosen to signal the modality: the potential event (potential mood in linguistics) in the pre-announcement wave versus the actual fact (realis mood) post-announcement. The grammatical emphasis on the "actual fact" is implicit, in order to avoid explicitly mentioning the policy announcement event. The answer options also include "I have NOT heard any news about the Fed policy" and "I have heard some other news about the Fed, namely:" with a possibility of a free-text answer.
&
In terms of control variables, we have an extensive set of characteristics we can condition on like age, gender, household income, U.S. census region or even the device type used by respondents. In addition, we assess participants' nancial literacy by asking how many of the four statements (equivalent to QK4 b and QK5 a, b and c in INFE (2011)) shown in one question are true. By design, all of them are true, thus the answer gives us a measure of nancial literacy on the scale 0-4. On average, slightly below 50% of participants recognize that all 4 questions are true. ' For reference, the 2015 S&P Global FinLit Survey (Klapper et al., 2015) , using a more detailed and comprehensive methodology, found about 57% of adults in U.S. are nancially literate, which is a comparable gure to ours. Table 1 presents summary statistics of the main variables.
In our data ination expectations have a median of 5 and fall in the same range as beliefs in D'Acunto et al. Notably, in the post-announcement survey, many respondents who choose "some other news" option, indicate they heard news the Fed intended to decide but they didn't know what the actual decision was.
This speaks in favor of our modality wording. ' Some 23% respondents answer that 3 out of 4 are true, 17% answer that 2 out of 4 are true, and the remainder reports that either one or none are true.
Data is truncated by removing respondents who spent less than 150 seconds or more than 900 seconds to answer our questionnaire. The median time spent on the survey was 340 seconds. In trials we noted that when people make an eort to reect on their answers it takes 3 minutes or more to complete the survey. We treat respondents with long completion times (over 900 seconds) as inattentive. Moreover, all estimations remove the top and bottom 5% of the dependent variable. Truncation by time spent on the survey sacrices less than 3% of the sample on top of this truncation by reported values. Results are qualitatively robust to variations in these truncation criteria.
is higher than reported in other surveys like University of Michigan of Consumer or the New York Fed's Survey of Consumer Expectations (average median ination expectation of 2.6 over our period). We believe this dierence is due to the sample selection. Both Michigan and FRBNY surveys operate with a sample where a large fraction of participants took part in the previous waves of the survey (up to 80% in FRBNY), and the sample selection procedure involves contacting participants who previously completed the questionnaire and thus are likely to do so again. In contrast, in our survey, an eort is made to minimize the repetition, as conducting such a survey may draw subjects' attention to news on ination and central banks, and thus articially inate the fraction of informed consumers in subsequent rounds. Dräger and Lamla (2017) Econometrically speaking, a level dierence is not relevant as long as the survey responses are meaningfully correlated with the true ination perceptions/expectations. To further validate the quality of our survey responses, we calculate the correlation coecient between our monthly average and the monthly average of CPI, the Michigan Survey ination expectations and the Survey of Professional Forecaster ination expectations. The correlation coecient between perceived ination based on our data and the ocial CPI gure is 0.5; the correlation coecient between expected ination in our data and the survey of professional forecasters is 0.27. This positive and statistically signicant co-movement between reality/best possible forecast and perceptions/expectations is reassuring. Table 1 is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if respondents report condence level of 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale. Less than half of respondents show this degree of condence, signifying a large bit of uncertainty they face when reporting expectations and perceptions. Condence in future values is lower than that in current rates: 43-44% respondents say they are condent in their perception of the past ination and interest rate, while only 35-40% are condent in their estimate of the expected interest rate and ination rate. A rather obvious explanation would be that it is harder to predict the future than to reect on the present. Along with perceptions and expectations, condence is our variable of interest in detecting the impact of monetary policy announcements on beliefs.
The condence variable in
The main explanatory variable in our design is the variable Announcement. It takes a value of 1 if the respondent belongs to the post-announcement subsample and 0 otherwise.
By construction, the split between pre-and post-announcement is roughly half-half. The second key explanatory factor is the variable capturing whether the respondent reports having heard some news on the Fed in the last week (News Fed Notes: Kernel density plots. The blue line shows the distribution of perceptions and expectations of individual respondents 1-2 days before the announcement event. The red line depicts the distributions of expectations and perceptions 1-2 days after the announcement event.
3 Results
Mean Eects
We begin our analysis by comparing the densities of expectations and perceptions of ination and interest rates before and after the announcement. In Figure 1 each panel plots two distributions (kernel densities): the pre-announcement distribution is shown in blue and the post-announcement in red. While we observe a slightly increased concentration of the post-announcement densities with some shift to the left, the changes are not substantial: the announcement eect on expectations and perceptions of both ination and interest rates is close to nil.
One might argue that nding almost no dierences between pre-and post-announcement samples in this graph might be due to the underlying dispersion, particularly reecting variation in actual ination and interest rates or the monetary policy stance across announcements. To get a feeling for the relevance of this variation over time we purge the Notes: The blue line shows the distribution of the residuals of expectations and perceptions purged by all xed eects 1-2 days before the announcement, while the red line depicts the distributions of the residuals 1-2 days after the announcement. Specically, they are residuals from the following estimation:
distribution by time/announcement specic eects. For this purpose we run the regression y i = α + τ t + ε i , where τ t accounts for time/announcement-specic xed eects, and plot the residuals of this estimation. Figure 2 shows perceptions and expectations before and after announcements, purged by time xed eects. The conclusion remains the same: we observe a very minor, if at all noticeable, eect of announcements. The only visible dierence of this cleaning exercise is that both distributions became somewhat smoother.
Finding no announcement eect in the whole sample may be due to a failure of either the information channel (no updating of beliefs) or the news channel (low or no change in the number of informed subjects), or both. To test the relevance of the exposure to news channel, Figure 3 compares expectations and perceptions of consumers who heard some news about the Fed's monetary policy with those who did not receive such news. As in Figure 1 , we use kernel densities, marking expectations and perceptions of subjects who were not exposed to news with the blue line, and using the red line for consumers who report that they heard some news on the Fed policy decision. For a more rigorous analysis of the role of announcements we regress perceptions and expectations of ination and interest rates on announcement events. Given our identication approach, the following regression allows for a causal interpretation of the role of announcements on perceptions and expectations:
For reasons of robustness we also purged the distribution by all time, region and demographic xed eects. Results remain the same.
Both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Epps-Singleton two-sample test of similarity of distributions lead to qualitatively identical results, not rejecting similarity of distributions before and after the announcement, but strongly rejecting similarity of distributions generated by dierent exposures to news at p < .001. Announcements may raise the fraction of informed consumers, because they trigger media reports about the Fed. In our data about 30% of consumers report having heard news about the Fed already before the announcement, yet this share rises signicantly to approximately 40% in the rst two days after the announcement. To test the causal impact of announcements on the probability of exposure to policy news, we estimate the following probit regression (notation is as above, and F is the probit transformation):
which explains the probability of an individual receiving news about the Fed by FOMC announcements taking place (in other words, it measures whether more consumers report that they have received news in the days after the announcement). As the coverage of the Fed meeting may intensify already shortly before the announcement when journalists and experts start discussing potential outcomes and their implied consequences, it is fair to say we estimate a lower bound of the announcement eect on news exposure. " Results for model (2) are in Table 3 with the bi-variate system (Γ = 0) reported in column 1, and added control for the whole set of socioeconomic characteristics and survey xed eects " If we compare post-announcement data with, for instance, a week beforehand, we would likely observe an even stronger movement in the amount of additional news received. However, this would come at a cost of a weaker identication. (3). Odd columns report results with no controls (Γ = 0), while even columns show estimates that take all available controls into account. In all cases coecients for the N ewsF ed variable are signicant and negative, conrming that expectations of informed consumers dier from those of uninformed, as one would expect for the information channel. Note that adding controls reduces the coecient estimate for N ewsF ed, which is due to a reduction of such biases as, for example, self-selection (consumers with certain demographic characteristics may be more likely to follow Fed news, and at the same time may dier in expectations from the rest of the sample). In all cases the remaining eect is still statistically signicant. N ewsF ed × Announcement is an interaction term. Survey, Demographic and Regional represent xed eects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **,* denote signicance at 99%,95% and 90% level.
The eect of exposure to news might be dierent before and after announcement.
If policy announcements improve the precision and clarity of news the eect of news should be bigger after an announcement. To test this, we amend model (3) by adding an interaction term between the news and the announcement dummies:
Results are in Table Table 4 ). Announcements here only aect beliefs of the informed cohort # , which speaks in favor of the information channel. For expected ination, the inclusion of the interaction term alters the coecient and signicance of the announcement dummy, which implies dierences for the uninformed cohort, too: while the average belief of the informed cohort after the announcement goes down, it goes up for the uninformed subjects. Although we control for individual characteristics of respondents, we cannot completely rule out the endogeneity of exposure to news in this case (see Section 4 for a more detailed discussion).
It follows that even though the causal eect of announcements on exposure to news is signicant (Table 3) , this exogenous variation in the exposure to news does not seem to aect beliefs apart from some eect on perceived ination. # Additional estimations of (3) separately for subsamples of informed and uninformed subjects conrmed no eect of exposure to news on uninformed subsample and signicant eect on the informed one. Our nal question in this subsection is whether communication guides beliefs in the right direction. To test this we estimate models (1) and (4) where the dependent variable y is now dened as the absolute dierence between the perceived ination rate and the actual ination rate (CPI ination) denoted as "ape" (absolute perception error) and the absolute dierence between the expected ination rate and the average expected ination rate of professional forecasters (absolute expectations gap, "aeg"). Table 5 presents the results. Indeed, we observe that the absolute perception error is smaller for people that have heard news, more so after the announcement (columns (2) and (3) respectively).
If news change perceptions, as discussed above, then the result in Table 5 suggests it steers perceptions in the right direction as well. For expected ination, being informed also means having expectations closer to those of professional forecasters, see column (5) .
However the marginal contribution of announcement here is blurred by the suspected endogeneous redistribution of subjects between the informed and the uninformed cohorts, similarly to what we discussed above with respect to To investigate the importance of announcements and news for the probability of being condent, we estimate the following probit regression:
Again, we control for individual socioeconomic characteristics, region, nancial literacy and time eects, all reected in Z. Results are in Table 6 , where panels A and B are analogous to the level analysis in 
Press Conferences
Over the past years there has been a substantial increase in the level of communication to the general public. Empirical studies provide evidence that with press conferences and forward guidance the central bank can inuence expectations. However, there is no evidence whether holding a press conference in comparison to, for instance, announcing the federal funds target rate, has any value added. Our data allows us to judge directly on the relevance of holding a press conference by comparing meetings with and without one. At the descriptive level we observe that in weeks with a press conference the share of people receiving news about the Fed is slightly higher on average (27% without vs 36% with press conference). The share of people who have heard news about the Fed before the announcement and after the announcement in the no-press-conference sample is almost identical (approximately 27%). This is in stark contrast to the 10% increase (31% to 41%) in the share of subjects exposed to news when a press conference is being held. To test this eect econometrically, we augment the probit analysis of the announcement eect on the exposure to news from Table 3 by adding a dummy "nopress" that equals 1 if there was no press conference, and zero if there was one. Table 7 shows having no press conferences has a negative and statistically signicant (columns 1 and 2) eect on the exposure to news. As the main eect of news comes from the announcement, we add an interaction term between this dummy and the announcement. The marginal eect of this interaction is reported in column (3). Announcements with a press conference increase the probability of receiving news by 10.7% while FOMC meetings without press conferences have no eect that is statistically dierent from zero.
Our analysis thus reveals that holding a press conference has a remarkable added value as almost all of the positive eect of announcements on news exposure stems from press conferences. That being said we need to highlight one shortcoming of this distinction.
Meetings with and without press conferences are not perfectly identical as meetings with press conferences have been used for announcements of major policy changes as well as for the publication of the quarterly economic projections. As both interest rate change decisions and the outcome of economic projections have been widely anticipated in our sample period, most of the increased news exposure should be attributed to the content of the press conference of the FOMC meeting.
Discussion
Even though consumers are believed to lack knowledge and skills to digest information about monetary policy, there are experts who make news digestible, and mass media who deliver such digestible news to consumers. If experts' expectations are rational, informed consumers predict monetary policy (changes), too, hence announcements aect neither their expectations nor their expectation errors. Still, announcements may aect the mean belief in the population by raising the news coverage and through that the exposure of people to news. In this case, if informed and uninformed subjects dier in beliefs, the average expectations in the population should change after the announcement.
Empirically we, indeed, observe a signicant increase of the informed cohort after the announcement, yet there is no signicant impact of announcements on average beliefs.
We also observe announcements exert no signicant eect on beliefs of the informed cohort, apart from their perceptions of current ination, which seem to update downwards.
Somewhat surprisingly, condence in the informed cohort post-announcement is also lower than pre-announcement, and this holds for all the four indicators used. In this section we take a deeper look into these observations.
To clarify the interaction between the two channels, consider expectations formed at two dates, t = 0 and t = 1. Fraction a(t) of the population, denoted as type a, are aware of monetary policy developments (we call them informed), while fraction 1 − a(t), denoted as type u, remain unexposed to news (we call them uninformed). % Let i e,a (t) and i e,u (t) be expectations of a specic interest rate, such as a car loan, of the above two groups of consumers. At each date t, the average expected interest rate i e (t) in the population is:
i e (t) = a (t) · i e,a (t) + (1 − a (t)) · i e,u (t)
% Types may be seen as exogeneous to consumers and randomly drawn by nature, in which case a(t)
is the probability of being type a. In particular, this view is convenient to interpret the impact of mass media on a(t): an increase in media coverage makes it more likely that consumers come across news, and hence probability of being informed increases.
Before the announcement, at t = 0, mass media communicate expert opinions on the interest rate the Central bank can set as a target. This informs expectations of the informed public, i e,a (0). At t = 1 the central bank communicates its policy [target] interest rate, which aects expectations of informed consumers i e,a (1). Beliefs of type u consumers are unaected by signals from the Central Bank or experts; they may still be based on historical macroeconomic data. This simple setup exposes two channels through which policy communication can impact expectations. First, this occurs through providing information that diers from expert views. This information channel may induce a change in i e,a (t) but not in i e,u (t). Second, the impact may come through a change in the fraction of informed subjects, a (t), which is the exposure to news channel.
Announcements are irrelevant for expectations if i e (0) = i e (1). This happens in one of the following four cases: (i) the exposure to news channel fails and nobody is informed, a(1) = a(0) = 0, (ii) some people are informed but both the news and the information channels fail, a(1) = a(0) > 0 and i e,a (1) = i e,a (0), (iii) only the information channel fails, a(1) ̸ = a(0) but i e,u (0) = i e,a (0) = i e,a (1), and (iv) none of the channels fails, but the eects through them perfectly oset each other, a (0) · [i e,a (0) − i e,u (0)] = a (1) · [i e,a (1) − i e,u (0)]. The latter happens, for example, if more people are informed after the announcement, a(1) > a(0), yet their beliefs update toward those of the uninformed public, i.e. one of the following holds: either i e,a (0) > i e,a (1) > i e,u (0), or i e,a (0) < i e,a (1) < i e,u (0). & We may interpret case (iv) as an inecient communication.
Our results demonstrate the exposure to news channel is alive, and in particular we nd a(1) > a(0) > 0 (Table 3 ) thus ruling out cases (i) and (ii). As for the information channel, we nd that subjects who receive news have lower ination (and interest rate) expectations and perceptions than those unexposed ( Table 4 , Panel B), which violates the above equivalence, and thus rules out the inecient communication case. The remaining explanation for the empirical irrelevance of announcements within this simple view is the small size of the cohort of informed subjects, which possibly makes the overall impact of announcements in our sample small and statistically insignicant.
However the cohorts of informed and uninformed consumers are not necessarily homogeneous. A concern may arise regarding possible endogeneity of exposure to news:
consumers with low expectations and perceptions may be more inclined to read news, and thus are more likely to receive news after the announcement.
' The endogenous redistribution of consumers between the informed and the uninformed cohorts may imply changes in average expectations within each cohort, while maintaining no change in the aggregate. Assume that consumers are of two types -fraction λ with low expectation i and fraction 1 − λ with high expectation i, a fraction a(t) of the former and a(t) of the latter is informed at each t. The average expectation in the population is λ · i + (1 − λ) · i independent of t. Average expectations of the informed cohort depend on the endogeneously determined proportion of high and low types in it:
i e,a (t) = λ · a(t) a(t)
where the fractions on the right-hand side are relative shares of the two types of consumers in the informed cohort, and a(t) = λ · a(t) + (1 − λ) · a(t) is the total mass of informed consumers. Now both the exposure to news, a(t), and the average informed beliefs, i e,a (t), are determined by the distribution of types, given by a(t) and a(t). If types are not controlled for, the omitted variable bias, and thus the endogeneity problem, arise.
First, we control for a rich array of individual characteristics, which help describe the two types and reduce the bias. Second, an endogenous redistribution of subjects between the informed and the uninformed cohorts inevitably implies a change in expectations of the informed cohort is matched by an oppositely directed change in expectations of the ' We thank our discussant, Carola Binder, for stimulating remarks on this issue.
In particular, gender, age and income are important drivers of expectations, see, e.g. Leung et al. (2009). uninformed cohort.
This may be the case for ination expectations ( 2) ).
Although endogeneity alone cannot explain the result for ination perceptions and does not completely rule out the information eect on ination expectations, the role of the information channel appears rather limited.
A similar decomposition of channels applies to condence in beliefs: the information channel may aect condence of informed consumers, while the news exposure channel would raise the number of them. The diversity of expert opinions (even though all of them are rational) implies consumers face more uncertainty before the announcement than after, and hence condence in expectations implied by expert reports should be lower than that in expectations based on the policy communication by the central bank.
However an increase in the share of informed subjects after the announcement means informing subjects who previously did not pay attention to monetary policy news. If their condence is low, the average condence of the post-announcement informed cohort may be lower than pre-announcement. This is exactly what we observe in our data.
However we believe a more detailed analysis is needed to investigate the eects of the announcement on those who always follow the news, or even actively seek for this type of news, and those who only sporadically receive news.
Conclusion
While there is ample evidence of nancial markets' reaction to central bank announcements, little is known on how consumers and the greater public receive this information and how they respond to it. To address the issue, we have generated a new dataset by repeatedly running a survey of U.S. consumers just before and right after FOMC press conferences, ensuring sound identication of the announcement factor. This new data allows us to track the eect of announcements on perceptions and expectations of rele-As a special case, one could x the average belief of the uninformed cohort by assuming its composition does not change, i.e. (1 − a(t))/(1 − a(t) ) is constant, but in this rather extreme case the average belief of the informed cohort ought to change upwards after the announcement, as there will be a disproportionate inow of high types in the informed cohort, or the informed cohort will have beliefs above those uninformed -both contradict our data. A formal exposition of this argument is available on request.
vant variables as well as consumers' condence therein. Our main nding is that FOMC announcements have little measurable eect on consumers' perceptions and expectations of ination and interest rates.
To rationalize this result, we distinguish between two channels through which announcements potentially contribute to the expectation formation process. One is the information channel: announcements give details on the current state of the economy and on the future directions of monetary policy and economic development of the country.
The second one is the news exposure channel: announcements raise the probability of receiving news by the public. As for the latter, we nd FOMC press-conferences increase the probability of receiving news by approximately 10%. As for the former, we do nd beliefs and condence of consumers who receive news dier from the uninformed cohort.
For ination beliefs we observe an improvement in their quality. In striking contrast to professional forecasters and nancial markets, who are known to respond to policy news, for ordinary consumers our data documents only minor eects. While the current system of policy communication succeeds to an extent in reaching out to consumers (the news channel) and aecting their expectations (the information channel), more could be done in this direction.
On average only 35% of consumers in our data are aware of the FOMC announcement during the announcement week; their share is 10% higher after the announcement than before. Of course reaching all consumers is neither necessary nor ecient, but it should be possible to increase this informedness ratio. We nd that so far press conferences have been a useful tool of drawing media attention to monetary policy announcements, and through that increasing dissemination of news among the public. Receiving news in turn can improve the quality of beliefs. If central banks want to use the media channel more actively, research should focus on identifying what makes media pay more attention to policy announcements, and what makes people absorb this news.
Outsourcing central bank communication to the media has an advantage of interpreting complex policy wordings in plain language accessible to ordinary consumers. This comes at a risk that simplied language might, at some point, undermine precision and thus the positive eect of spreading out news about the Fed might be oset. A number of central banks, including the Fed, the ECB, the Bank of England (BoE), among others, attempt to increase the communication outreach via Twitter and other social media; the BoE has begun to use simplied language to make messages more accessible. Given our results, this makes well sense as more outreach appears useful for the quality of beliefs.
Whether communicating with the public through social media is the right channel, is still a big question. On the one hand, this channel mainly covers people who are interested in receiving news about the central bank. On the other hand, this group of people almost surely includes experts who then broadcast central bank news to ordinary people, and thus being actively present on social media with more news and policy guidance may pay o. With this in mind, it may well make sense for the central banks to keep outsourcing communication with the general public to mass media, while using social networks for communication with experts and triggering more and more persistent news coverage through them. However, more research is necessary to identify the right channels, the right language and the right amount.
Our analysis highlights the importance of media as a transmission device between the central bank and the greater public. As such, it justies the great eorts of central banks over the last 20 years to become more transparent with regard to their policy. In particular, it reects the importance of press conferences, which draw signicant attention of media outlets, as a crucial tool in managing the expectations of the greater public.
However, it also shows that more eorts are needed to increase the awareness of ordinary • Ocial sources (like the webpages of the White House, the Government, statistical agencies or the Fed)
• Articles in specialised newspapers (like Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Economist) -online or in print
